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Abstract
The Availability bias, manifested in the over-representation
of extreme eventualities in decision-making, is a well-known
cognitive bias, and is generally taken as evidence of human ir-
rationality. In this work, we present the first rational, metacog-
nitive account of the Availability bias, formally articulated at
Marr’s algorithmic level of analysis. Concretely, we present
a normative, metacognitive model of how a cognitive system
should over-represent extreme eventualities, depending on the
amount of time available at its disposal for decision-making.
Our model also accounts for two well-known framing effects
in human decision-making under risk—the fourfold pattern of
risk preferences in outcome probability (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1992) and in outcome magnitude (Markovitz, 1952)—
thereby providing the first metacognitively-rational basis for
those effects. Empirical evidence, furthermore, confirms an
important prediction of our model. Surprisingly, our model
is unimaginably robust with respect to its focal parameter.
We discuss the implications of our work for studies on hu-
man decision-making, and conclude by presenting a counter-
intuitive prediction of our model, which, if confirmed, would
have intriguing implications for human decision-making un-
der risk. To our knowledge, our model is the first metacog-
nitive, resource-rational process model of cognitive biases in
decision-making.
Keywords: Availability bias; Decision-making under uncer-
tainty and risk; Metacognitively rational models; Fourfold pat-
tern of risk preferences
1 Introduction
Which one comes to your mind easier? The most horrible
car crash of your life, or the event of driving home safely
on an ordinary day? Among the great many cognitive biases
documented in the literature, the Availability bias (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1972) is a notable one: people overestimate the
probability of events that easily come to mind. A number of
notable effects can be explained by this cognitive bias: peo-
ple’s overestimation of the frequency of extreme events like
an earthquake (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, &
Combs, 1978) and people’s overreaction to threats like ter-
rorism (Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Rothman, Klein, & Wein-
stein, 1996, Sunstein & Zeckhauser, 2011). Neurobiological
work shows that the strength of a memory is modulated by
the salience of its positive or negative valance (Cruciani et al.,
2011), thereby providing a possible explanation of the Avail-
ability bias.
Recently, Lieder, Griffiths, and Hsu (2014, 2017) pro-
posed a boundedly-optimal, rational process model of this
bias which can explain a wide range of findings in the human-
decision making literature. Drawing on the importance sam-
pling paradigm, their account aimed to minimize the mean
squared error (MSE) of an expected utility estimator, as a
well-established and normatively-justified measure of quality
of an estimator (Poor, 2013). Since the variance of the esti-
mator is the asymptotically-dominant term in the MSE (i.e.,
for large sample size, variance becomes an accurate proxy for
MSE), Lieder et al. (2014, 2017) suggested that people adopt
the following importance distribution (as the importance dis-
tribution minimizing the variance):
q(o) ∝ p(o)|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|, (1)
for mental simulations of events. In (1), o denotes an arbitrary
event, p the objective probability of event o, u(o) the utility
of event o, q the probability distribution one adopts for their
mental simulations (i.e., the subjective probability of event
o), and, finally, Ep[·] the expectation with respect to p.
Note that the expression in (1) does not depend on the
number of samples one gets to draw before making their de-
cision (denoted by s). In that light, Lieder et al.’s (2014,
2017) account implies that time availability, i.e., the amount
of time a decision-maker has for making a decision, should
have no implications on what importance distribution q one
adopt. While a cognitively-rational agent is ignorant about
adapting their importance distribution q based on time avail-
ability, a metacognitively-rational agent plausibly considers
that in their choice of q. That is, the metacognitively-rational
agent chooses, among all q’s, the one which is normatively-
justified based on time availability considerations—this es-
sentially makes it a strategy selection task guided by time
availability. In agreement with this view, a large body of psy-
chological work on decision-making suggests that (1) peo-
ple evoke different strategies for decision making under time
pressure vs. no time pressure condition, and (2) people adapt
their strategies in accord with time availability (see e.g., Sven-
son & Maule, 1993; Svenson, 1993).
In this work, we present the first normative, metacognitive
model of how an agent should over-represent extreme even-
tualities, depending on the amount of time available at their
disposal for decision making. Concretely, our work serves
as a rational, meta-level model for the work by Lieder et
al. (2017, 2014). More specifically, the importance distri-
bution suggested by Lieder et al. (2017, 2014) naturally fol-
lows from our metacognitive account, when s is large (i.e. for
large sample size regime). In contrast to Lieder et al. (2017,
2014), our meta-level account also specifies how a decision-
maker should rationally choose their importance distribution
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when they can only afford to collect merely very few sam-
ples (i.e. when making decision under extremely high time
pressure).1 Importantly, recent work has provided mounting
evidence suggesting that people often use very few samples
in probabilistic judgments and reasoning under uncertainty
(e.g., Vul et al., 2014; Battaglia et al. 2013; Lake et al., 2017;
Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Hertwig & Pleskac,
2010; Griffiths et al., 2012; Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum,
2012; Bonawitz et al., 2014), elevating the importance of
developing process models specifically directed at the small
sample size regime.
We show that our model can account for two well-known
framing effects in human decision-making under risk: the
fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome probabil-
ity (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and in outcome mag-
nitude (Markovitz, 1952). Despite being often taken as
strong evidence for human irrationality, we provide the first
metacognitively-rational basis for these effects. Empirical ev-
idence, furthermore, confirms an important prediction of our
model: over-representation of extreme events regardless of
their frequencies. Our model also makes a counterintuitive
(normative) prediction, which, if confirmed, would have sur-
prising implications for human decision-making under risk.
2 Proposed Model
In this section, we formally present our metacognitively-
rational model for the Availability bias (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1973). According to the expected utility theory (Von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), an agent chooses an action
a, with the highest expected utility
E[u(o)] =
∫
p(o|a)u(o)do, (2)
where p(o|a) denotes the distribution over outcomes o result-
ing from taking action a, u(o) the subjective utility associated
to outcome o, and E[·] the expectation operation. Since the
computation of (2) is intractable in general, we assume that
the agent estimates (2) using sampling methods (Hammers-
ley & Handscomb, 1964). Substantial neural and behavioral
evidence supports this hypothesis (see e.g. Fiser, Berkes, Or-
ban, & Lengyel, 2010; Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenen-
baum, 2014; Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2013;
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2006). Concretely, following Lieder
et al. (2014, 2017), we assume that the agent estimates (2)
using (self-normalized) importance sampling (Hammersley
& Handscomb, 1964; Geweke, 1989), which is shown to
have connections to both neural networks (Shi & Griffiths,
2009) and cognitive process models (Shi, Griffiths, Feldman,
& Sanborn, 2010):
Eˆ =
1
∑sj=1 w j
s
∑
i=1
wiu(oi), ∀i : oi ∼ q, wi = p(oi)q(oi) . (3)
1The optimality of Lieder et al.’s (2017, 2014) model hinges on
the number of samples s being large. When s is small (i.e. small
sample size regime) Lieder et al.’s (2017, 2014) model is no longer
optimal. Our model, however, remains rational for both small and
large s’s.
In Eq. (3), s denotes the total number of mental simulations
performed by the agent, oi the ith mentally simulated out-
come, u(oi) the utility of oi, p the objective probability of
event oi, q the probability distribution the agent adopts for
their mental simulations (i.e., the subjective probability of
event oi), and, Eˆ the (normalized) importance sampling es-
timator of E[u(o)] given in (2).
The mean-squared error (MSE) of the estimator in (3), as
a standard normative measure of the quality of an estima-
tor (Poor, 2013), can be decomposed as follows: E[(Eˆ −
E[u(o)])2] = (Bias[Eˆ])2+Var[Eˆ], where The bias Bias[Eˆ] and
variance Var[Eˆ] of the estimator Eˆ can be approximated by
(Zabaras, 2010):
Bias[Eˆ]≈ 1
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))do, (4)
Var[Eˆ]≈ 1
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do. (5)
Under mild technical conditions, it can be shown that the
rational importance distribution for minimizing the MSE of
the estimator Eˆ is given by:
q∗meta ∝ p(o)|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
1+ |u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
, (6)
where p denotes the objective probability of event o, andEp[·]
the expectation with respect to distribution p. We refer to
q∗meta given in (6) as the metacognitively-rational importance
distribution the agent should adopt for mental simulation of
events for decision-making under uncertainty. For the deriva-
tion of the expression given in (6), the reader is referred to
Sec. A-I of the Appendix.
Comparing expressions (1) and (6) reveals that the mul-
tiplicative factor
√
1+ |u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
, which we term
metacognitive rationality factor (MCRF), is what sets apart
Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017) cognitively-rational model (see
Eq. (1)) from our metacognitively-rational model. In the re-
mainder of this work, we show that MCRF plays a crucial role
in accounting for two important framing effects in decision-
making under risk. It is crucial to note that q∗meta takes into
account the amount of time available for making a decision
(i.e., time availability), as evidenced by expression (6) ex-
plicitly depending on the number of mental simulations s per-
formed by the agent.
Following Lieder et al. (2017, 2014), and for ease of expo-
sition, we assume Ep[u(o)] = 0 hereinafter.
3 Extreme Eventualities are Over-represented
Regardless of their Frequency
A simple investigation of the metacognitively-rational impor-
tance distribution q∗meta given in (6) yields an important pre-
diction of our model: Extreme eventualities should be over-
represented in decision-making, regardless of how rare or fre-
quent they are. Importantly, this effects is already empirically
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Figure 1: A metacognitively-rational agent should over-represent
extreme events precisely according to Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017)
cognitively-rational model, evidenced by the curves converging to
1 as u(o)→ +∞. Importantly, however, a metacognitively-rational
agent should also over-represent mundane events significantly more
than what a merely cognitively-rational model prescribes, evidenced
by the curves overshooting at the neighborhood of u(o) = 0.
confirmed (Lieder et al., 2017). Note that this coverage is to
be expected as our proposed model subsumes the model out-
lined in Lieder et al. (2014, 2017).
Importantly, a detailed analysis of MCRF reveals that a
metacognitively-rational agent should over-represent extreme
events precisely according to Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017)
cognitively-rational model, however, it should also over-
represent mundane events significantly more than what the
cognitively-rational model by Lieder et al. prescribes. These
findings are depicted in Fig. 1.
Next, we formally show that when the number of sam-
ples s is sufficiently large (i.e., for large sample size regime),
our proposed metacognitively-rational importance distribu-
tion q∗meta converges to the cognitively-rational importance
distribution of Lieder et al. (2014, 2017) given in (1).2
2More accurately, in formal terms, q∗meta converges to (1)
almost surely, except at u(o) = 0. Notice that despite the unbound-
edness of MCRF at u(o) = 0 (see Fig. 1), q∗meta remains bounded at
u(o) = 0.
Proposition 1. When the number of mental simulations s
is large, q∗meta converges to the importance distribution given
in (1). Formally, assuming u(o)−Ep[u(o)] 6= 0,
lim
s→+∞q
∗
meta =
1
Z
p(o)|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|, (7)
where Z is a normalizing constant (aka partition function).
For a formal proof of Proposition 1, the reader is referred
to Sec. A-II of the Appendix.
Proposition 1 formally establishes that our metacognitively
rational model of Availability bias serves as a rational, meta-
level model for the work by Lieder et al. (2017, 2014), with
our model converging to Lieder et al.’s when the number of
samples s is large. Note that, since Lieder et al.’s impor-
tance distribution was specifically derived under the assump-
tion that s is large, the result presented in Proposition 1 intu-
itively makes sense, and, importantly, attests to the claim that
our metacognitively-rational model subsumes Lieder et al.’s
cognitively-rational model, with the rationality of our model
holding for both small and large s’s while that of Lieder et
al.’s only for large s’s.
4 Framing Effect in Decision-Making
Past work has documented that people’s risk preferences are
inconsistent and context-dependent (see e.g., Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1992; Markovitz, 1952). For example, in choos-
ing between a safe gamble (low payoff with high probabil-
ity) and a risky gamble (high payoff with low probability),
risk preferences change depending on the probabilities of the
gambles (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the amount offered
(Markovitz, 1952), and whether those gambles are framed as
a gain or loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
In what follows, we show that our metacognitively-rational
model can account for two well-known framing effects in hu-
man decision-making under risk: the fourfold pattern of risk
preferences in outcome probability (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992) and in outcome magnitude (Markovitz, 1952). Thus,
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Accounting for the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), with few samples
(s = 2) and the utility function given in (8) based on the prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). (a) Our metacognitively-rational
model can account for the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome probability, with s = 2 and the utility function given in (8). (b)
Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017) cognitively-rational model prediction for the probability of choosing the risky choice, with s = 2 and the utility
function given in (8).
our model establishes the first metacognitively-rational basis
for those effects.
4.1 Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences in
Outcome Probability
Framing outcomes as losses rather than gains can reverse
people’s risk preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992): In
the domain of gains people prefer a lottery (o dollars with
probability p) to its expected value (i.e., risk seeking) when
p< 0.5, but when p> 0.5 they prefer the expected value (i.e.,
risk-aversion). Conversely, in the domain of losses people are
risk seeking when p < 0.5, and risk averse when p > 0.5.
This phenomenon is known as the fourfold pattern of risk
preferences in probability outcome. Next we show that our
metacognitively-rational model can simulate this effect. Fol-
lowing the prescriptions of the prospect theory (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992), as did Lieder et al. (2014) postulate, we
assume that the agent’s utility function can be modeled by:
u(o) =
{
o0.85 if o≥ 0,
−|o|0.95 if o < 0. (8)
Normatively, people should make their choice depending
on whether the expected value of the utility difference ∆u(o)
is negative or positive:
∆u(o) =
{
u(o)−u(p×o) with probability p,
−u(p×o) with probability 1− p. (9)
Fig. 2(a) shows that our metacognitively-rational model
can account for the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in out-
come probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), with the util-
ity function given in (8) based on the prospect theory (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1992) and very few samples (s = 2). This
result is fully consistent with past work suggesting that peo-
ple often use very few samples in probabilistic inference and
reasoning under uncertainty (e.g., Vul et al., 2014; Battaglia
et al. 2013; Lake et al., 2017; Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenen-
baum, 2015; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010; Griffiths et al., 2012;
Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum, 2012; Bonawitz et al., 2014).
Fig. 2(b) shows Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017) cognitively-
rational model prediction for the probability of choosing the
risky choice, with s = 2 and the utility function given in (8)
based on the prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Lieder et al.’s cognitively-rational model seems unable to ac-
count for the probability of risky choice suggested by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) using a suggested utility function by
the prospect theory given in (8); our simulations suggest that
this apparent failure also holds for other values of s. How-
ever, Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017) cognitively-rational model
can partially account for this effect (see Fig. 3) based on the
expected value of the importance sampling estimator given
in (3), E[Eˆ], replicating the finding reported in Lieder et al.’s
(2014) Fig 3.
In their recent work, Lieder et al. (2017) showed that
their cognitively-rational model can better account for the
Figure 3: Expected value of the importance sampling estimator
given in (3), E[Eˆ], with s= 2 and and the utility function given in (8),
showing that Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017) cognitively-rational model
can partially account for the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in
outcome probability. This replicates the finding reported in Lieder
et al.’s (2014) Fig 3. However, Lieder et al.’s (2017, 2014) model
appears to be unable to account for the probability of risky choice
suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), using the utility func-
tion given in (8) based on the prospect theory; cf. Fig. 2(b).
for the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome prob-
ability, provided that the utility function is noisy (efficient
neural coding, Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2015); see Fig. 4
in Lieder et al. (2017).3 The result reported in Fig. 2(a)
strongly suggests that this effect can be accounted for by a
purely metacognitively-rational model together with a utility
function fully consistent with the prospect theory (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992), without necessarily having to invoke a
noisy utility function (see Lieder et al., 2017, Appendix C).
4.2 Fourfold Pattern of Risk Preferences in
Outcome Magnitude
Past work in behavioral economics has documented an-
other curious inconsistency in human decision making under
risk: the fourfold of risk preferences in outcome magnitude
(Markovitz, 1952; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Scholten &
Read, 2014). Concretely, in choosing between a sure thing
and a low-probability risky gamble people demonstrate the
following behavioral pattern: In moderate-to-large outcomes,
people are risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses.
This pattern reverses when outcomes are small, with people
being risk-seeking for gains and risk-averse for losses. For
example, people would rather choose a sure 1 million dollar
option rather than a (low-probability) risky gamble yielding
$10 million dollars with probability 0.1 and nothing other-
wise (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980). When framed in the
context of losses, people prefer a risky gamble yielding $10
million dollar loss with probability 0.1 and nothing otherwise,
over a sure loss of $1 million dollars (Markowitz, 1952).
The prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1992), in its original form, cannot ac-
count for the fourfold of risk preferences in outcome mag-
nitude (Scholten & Read, 2014). However, Scholten and
3Specifically, Lieder et al. (2017) adopt the noisy utility function
u(o) = oomax−omin + ε, where ε is an additive Gaussian noise, i.e., ε∼
N(0,σ2).
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Simulating the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome magnitude, with few samples (s= 2) and the normalized logarithmic
utility function in (10) with α= 0.032 and β= 0.0031. (a) Our metacognitively-rational model can account for this effect: Moving from left
to right along the x-axis within the boxed region clearly shows the risk preference reversal from risk-seeking to risk-aversion (in losses), back
to risk-seeking and finally to risk-aversion (in gains). For ease of visualization, a magnified version of the part lying within the black square
is shown on the top-right. (b) Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017) cognitively-rational model prediction under the same setting as (a).
Read (2014) show that, armed with a particular choice of
utility function, the prospect theory can accommodate this ef-
fect. Concretely, they show that the prospect theory can best
account for this effect by adopting the normalized logarith-
mic utility function (Rachlin 1992; Scholten & Read, 2010;
Kirby, 2011; Kontek, 2011):
unlog(o) =

1
α
log(1+α.o) if o≥ 0,
−λ
β
log(1−β.o) if o < 0,
(10)
where α,β ∈ R>0, λ≥ 1 are free parameters.
Using empirical data, Scholten and Read (2014) found the
maximum-likelihood estimates of α and β to be 0.032 and
0.0031, respectively (see Scholten and Read, 2014, Table 4).
Adopting the normalized logarithmic utility function in (10)
with λ = 1,α = 0.032,β = 0.0031, we show that our model
can account for the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in
outcome magnitude (see Fig. 4(a)). However, Lieder et al.’s
(2014, 2017) cognitively-rational model appears to be unable
to account for this effect under the same setting. Again, our
simulations suggest this apparent failure holds for other val-
ues of s. These findings suggest that the fourfold pattern of
risk preferences in outcome magnitude could stem from the
optimization of a boundedly-rational agent’s decision strat-
egy at the metacognitive level, as suggested by (6).
5 Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed earlier, a metacognitively-rational agent opti-
mizes their decision strategy (in our case, their importance
distribution for mental simulations) according to time avail-
ability. This requires the agent to have a good estimate of the
number of samples s they will likely draw within the avail-
able time frame, using which they can appropriately select
their importance distribution q∗meta. However, a crucial ques-
tion immediately presents itself: What if the agent is inaccu-
rate at approximating the number of samples they get to draw
before making their decision? After all, it seems plausible to
assume that the agent would only have a rough estimate of the
parameter s. Thus, it would be very likely that there would be
a mismatch between the number of samples the agent thinks
they can draw, and the actual number of samples they finally
draw. Our model nicely allows for a quantitative investiga-
tion of the effects of such a mismatch. The parameter s in (6)
indicates the the number of samples the agent thinks they can
draw, whereas the parameter s in (3) reflects the the number of
samples the agent actually draws before making a decision. It
is worth noting that the cognitively-rational model by Lieder
et al. (2014, 2017) does not permit the investigation of the
possible mismatch alluded to above, as the parameter s does
not feature in Lieder et al.’s importance distribution (Eq. (1)).
Intriguingly, our model demonstrates a striking insensitiv-
ity to such mismatches: Even if the the number of sample the
agent thinks they can draw is unimaginably greater (to be pre-
cise, 108 times greater) than the the number of samples they
actually draw before making their decision, the agent should
still show the fourfold patterns. Figures are omitted due to
lack of space.
6 General Discussion
People overestimate the probability of extreme events, and
show the fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome
probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and in outcome
magnitude (Markovitz, 1952) in decision-making under risk;
these effects are generally taken as evidence against hu-
man rationality. In this work, we presented the first
metacognitively-rational process model which can account
for those effects, appearing to suggest that they might
not be signs of human irrationality after all, but the re-
sult of a boundedly-rational decision-maker optimizing their
decision strategy (in our case, their importance sampling
distribution for performing mental simulations) in accord
with time availability. In fact, it can be shown that the
metacognitively-rational importance distribution q∗meta in (6)
allows the decision-maker to ensure an upper-bound on the
MSE of their estimator for the expected value in (2) using
minimal number of samples, thereby demonstrating signs of
economy (rational minimalist program, Nobandegani, 2017).
Furthermore, our model is unimaginably robust to inaccurate
estimations its focal parameter s, positioning it as the first ra-
tional process model we know of which scores near-perfectly
in optimality, economical use of limited cognitive resources,
and robustness, all at the same time.
The metacognitively-rational process model presented in
this work and Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017) cognitively-rational
process model seem to suggest that a (boundedly) rational-
ist approach to understanding human decision-making at the
algorithmic level might be a fruitful endeavor. In fact, the
influential Rescorla-Wagner model (1972) and its extension
temporal-difference learning model (Sutton & Barto, 1987;
Sutton & Barto, 1998) can be given solid rational grounds
based on linear-Gaussian generative models and the Kalman
filtering paradigm, a rational scheme in signal detection the-
ory (Kalman, 1960).
Our model also makes a counterintuitive (normative) pre-
diction, which, if confirmed, would have surprising implica-
tions for human decision-making under risk: In choosing be-
tween a lottery (o dollars with probability p) and its expected
value (p×o), people should qualitatively behave the same un-
der the following two conditions: (i) making a decision based
on a mere single sample (i.e., under extremely high time pres-
sure) and (ii) making a decision based on a great many sam-
ples (i.e., after a along deliberation time). Note that, given
the normative status of our model, this is exactly the behav-
ior that a boundedly-rational agent should manifest, a finding
which would be of great interest for the artificial intelligence
community. If confirmed, this prediction seems to suggest an
intriguing possibility for human decision-making under risk:
people’s performance after long deliberation times is qualita-
tively similar to their performance under extremely high time
pressure (i.e., s = 1). This clearly serves as a motivation for
avoiding over-thinking.
For their cognitively-rational process model, Lieder et al.
(2017) proposed a neurally-plausible learning mechanism , a
simple modifications of which permits our metacognitively-
rational to be learned in a neurally-plausible manner as well.
Lieder et al. (2017) showed that their model can account
for impressively wide range of cognitive biases in deci-
sions from experience, decisions from description, and mem-
ory recall. Future work should investigate how well our
metacognitively-rational model can account for those biases.
The fact that our model subsumes Lieder et al.’s (2014, 2017)
model (see Proposition 1), greatly elevates the possibility of
our model capturing those effects as well.
To our knowledge, our model is the first metacognitive,
resource-rational process model of cognitive biases, and gen-
erally sheds light on possible rational grounds of human
decision-making. We hope to have made some progress in
this exciting direction.
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Appendix
A-I: Proof of q∗meta Given in (6)
Using (4)-(5), the mean-squared error (MSE) of the (normalized)
importance sampling estimator Eˆ (Eq. 3) can be written as:
E[(Eˆ−E[u(o)])2] ≈ 1
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do+
1
s2
[∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))do
]2
Under the mild technical condition
1
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do≤
[ 1√
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do
]2
,
the following holds
E[(Eˆ−E[u(o)])2]≤
[
1√
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do+
1
s
∣∣∣∣∫ p(o)2q(o) (Ep[u(o)]−u(o))do
∣∣∣∣]2
≤
[
1√
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do+
1
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
∣∣∣∣Ep[u(o)]−u(o)∣∣∣∣do]2
Next, we show that
q∗meta = argminq
[
1√
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do+
1
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
∣∣∣∣Ep[u(o)]−u(o)∣∣∣∣do]. (A.1)
Forming the Lagrangian,
L(q) =
1√
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
(Ep[u(o)]−u(o))2do+
1
s
∫ p(o)2
q(o)
∣∣∣∣Ep[u(o)]−u(o)∣∣∣∣do+
λ(
∫
q(o)do−1).
Equating the first variation to zero straightforwardly implies
δ
δq
L(q) = 0 =⇒
q∗meta ∝ p(o)|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
1+ |u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|s .
Note that, as a distribution (which integrates to one over all events
o), q∗meta is invariant under any multiplicative re-scaling by a purely
function of s, f (s), which does not involve o. Hence, using f (s) =
4
√
s, we have:
q∗meta ∝ p(o)|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
1+ |u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
,
thereby granting the validity of the expression (6) in the main text.
Finally, using Jensen’s inequality, it is straightforward to show that
q∗meta indeed satisfies (A.1). This completes the proof. 
A-II: Proposition 1
Proof. The distribution q∗meta given in (6) can be re-written as:
q∗meta ∝ p(o)|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
1+
1
|u(o)−Ep[u(o)]|
√
s
.
Assuming u(o)−Ep[u(o)] 6= 0, as n→+∞, the term shown in blue
approaches zero. This completes the proof. 
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